According to the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, the situated conceptualization used to construe a situation determines the emotion experienced. A neuroimaging experiment tested two core hypotheses of this theory: (1) different situated conceptualizations produce different forms of the same emotion in different situations, (2) the composition of a situated conceptualization emerges from shared multimodal circuitry distributed across the brain that produces emotional states generally. To test these hypotheses, the situation in which participants experienced an emotion was manipulated. On each trial, participants immersed themselves in a physical danger or social evaluation situation and then experienced fear or anger. According to Hypothesis 1, the brain activations for the same emotion should differ as a function of the preceding situation (after removing activations that arose while constructing the situation). According to Hypothesis 2, the critical activations should reflect conceptual processing relevant to the emotion in the current situation, drawn from shared multimodal circuitry underlying emotion. The results supported these predictions and demonstrated the compositional process that produces situated conceptualizations dynamically.
Introduction
Until recently, conceptualization has played a relatively peripheral role in theories of emotion (but see Fehr & Russell, 1984; Russell, 1991; Russell & Fehr, 1994) . In basic emotion approaches (e.g., Allport, 1924; Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971; McDougall, 1921 McDougall, /1908 Panksepp, 1998; Tomkins, 1962 Tomkins, , 1963 , the central hypotheses are that emotions reflect an inborn instinct, and that the mere presence of relevant external conditions triggers evolved brain mechanisms in a stereotyped and obligatory way (e.g., a snake triggers the fear circuit; Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, & Ingvar, 2007; Ohman & Mineka, 2001) . In appraisal approaches to emotion (e.g., Arnold, 1960a Arnold, , 1960b Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991) , the central hypotheses are that emotions arise from a meaning analysis of the situation in terms of goals, needs, or concerns, and that these conceptualizations of external situational conditions elicit basic emotions independent of any further conceptual processing. In both basic emotion approaches, emotions exist independently of human concepts for them. The cognitive system might conceptually represent what an emotion is and what is likely to occur when one is elicited, but these conceptualizations do not play central roles in emotion itself.
Recent theoretical developments, however, give conceptualization a central role in the construction of emotional episodes (Barrett, 2006a (Barrett, , 2009a . According to this approach, conceptualizing a situation in a particular way causes it to be experienced as an emotion (where by situation we mean not only an environmental setting and the physical entities and agents it contains, but also the dynamic actions that agents perform, and the events, interoceptive sensations, and mentalizing they experience). As the brain represents successive situations one after another, conceptual interpretation of each situation -sometimes taking the form of an emotion -creates a unified, meaningful representation of subjective experience, cognition, and the body in context, and then controls subsequent experience, cognition, and action.
In this article, we begin by presenting a grounded theory of the conceptual system that underlies our account of how conceptualization produces emotion. The theory's central assumptions are: (1) a concept is grounded in the systems for perception, action, and internal states that process its instances; (2) the situated conceptualization that represents a concept on a specific occasion 0028-3932/$ -see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.032
